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When we communicate with language, we represent ourselves inseveral ways. Various speech acts carry with them standard waysin which speakers thereby represent themselves. For example,
imperatives, such as commanding someone to do something, represent the
speaker as having, and exercising, some sort of authority over them. Request-
ing that someone pass the salt represents the speaker as wanting the salt, or
at least wanting to be passed it, and perhaps also that the addressee is near
enough to do so. Similarly, interrogatives, such as asking about a friend’s
whereabouts, typically represent the speaker as not already knowing, or even
believing, an answer.
Assertion is likewise a type of speech act, one typically engaged in by
uttering an unqualified declarative sentence. In asserting, one represents
something about oneself as well as about the world: not only does asserting
put forth a claim as true, but also, in asserting, a speaker thereby represents
themself as knowing the claim they’ve asserted. The stability of the linguistic
data which support this representational idea has been coupled with intu-
itive normative judgments about particular cases. Many philosophers have
suggested that the best explanation of this data is that the speech act of asser-
tion is tightly connected to a norm or rule on such acts, according to which,
roughly: one should not assert that p unless one knows that p. The present
chapter summarizes the case made so far, and argues further that the speech
act of assertion has knowledge as its central norm.1
In section 1, I situate the knowledge norm, and provide some rival ac-
counts. Section 2 provides an overview of the data which any such norm
aims to explain. Section 3 considers some objections to the knowledge norm,
1See Williamson 2000, Chap. 11, and Turri 2016b for the most thorough treatments.
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and some complaints which masquerade as objections. Finally, in section 4,
I oer some concluding thoughts.
1 Formulating the Knowledge Norm
Most agree that there is a norm with epistemic content which governs asser-
tions, the default speech act made using unqualified declarative sentences,
for example, “Houston averages more annual rainfall than Seattle.” Though
the basic idea was embraced by many previous philosophers,2 contemporary
formulations of the knowledge norm take the form of a necessary condition3
on proper assertion, where the dimension of propriety tracks the epistemic
position of a speaker to make the assertion. The most succinct version of
the norm simply says that you should know what you assert. A more formal
version is given by Williamson (2000, 241):
(kna) One must: assert that p only if one knows that p
kna thus forbids asserting when one does not know the proposition one as-
serts; equivalently, it permits asserting only when one knows what one asserts.
As Williamson thinks of it, kna should be understood “as giving the condi-
tion on which a speaker has the authority to make an assertion. Thus asserting
p without knowing p is doing something without having the authority to do
it, like giving someone a command without having the authority to do so”
(2000, 257).4 As such, one should not assert p without having the requisite
2Moore 1962, 227 and 277; Austin 1961, 45; Unger 1975, Chap. 6; Slote 1979.
3Some also discuss whether knowledge is sucient for (epistemically) proper assertion:
see Lackey 2011 and 2016, and Benton 2016a for more.
4It is a further question what the status of this norm is, or how it fits into a fuller account
of assertion. Williamson 1996/ 2000, Chap. 11, argues for a “simple” account (2000, 241–
242), on which the norm is constitutive of the speech act of assertion, on analogy with the way
that rules constitute a game, where grasp of the proper move within the rules implies mastery
of the applicability of that rule (see Maitra 2011 for criticism). Williamson also claims the
norm is individuating of assertion, thus unique to it (see Turri 2014, and Simion and Kelp
2020 for more). It should be noted, however, that several proponents of a knowledge norm
on assertion do not feel the need to endorse some of these claims (e.g., Turri 2018 argues
for it as a sustaining rule; Sosa 2010 and 2015, 170–171, as a teleological performance norm;
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authority to assert p, namely, knowing p. The idea is that assertions are always
governed by kna,5 which is why asserting represents one as knowing.6
Rival accounts of the norm typically appeal to other notions of epis-
temic interest, such as a justification or credibility or supportive reasons norm
(Lackey 2007, Douven 2006, McKinnon 2013), a justified belief norm (Kvan-
vig 2009), or a truth norm (Weiner 2005), among others. For example,
Weiner’s truth norm says that one should assert that p only if p is true (and
that this would provide a derivative norm requiring one to have evidence for
its truth). Or, Lackey’s alternative norm says that one should assert that p
only if it is reasonable (given one’s evidence) for one to believe that p, even
if one doesn’t so believe. In what follows I focus mainly on the arguments
presented in favor of kna; some objections are considered in section 3.
2 Approaching the Data
The case for kna derives from multiple strands of data which kna explains
well; indeed, it seems to oer the best unified explanation of those strands.
These strands are often sorted into data from problematic conjunctions, sev-
eral interrelated conversational patterns, and intuitive judgments of permissi-
bility, excusability, and blame. Additional evidence comes from structurally
comparable data from ascriptions of knowing and showing how.
or in functionalist terms, e.g., Turri 2016c, Kelp 2018). And some alternative approaches to
individuating assertion can arguably nevertheless accept that knowledge is the central norm
of assertion (see MacFarlane 2011: several of the views which he contrasts with Williamson’s
constitutive account can similarly endorse the knowledge norm).
5They will also be subject to other norms of prudence or morality in a given context.
6Some philosophers, such as Williamson (2000, esp. 252, n. 6, and 257), eschew an
account in terms of representation in favor of a more general account in terms of acting on
a kind of authority (in this case, epistemic authority); whereas others, like van Elswyk 2021,
defend the knowledge representation eect for declaratives in semantic terms (what he calls
parentheticalism), and thus he needn’t invoke a knowledge norm, which nevertheless could
be coupled with parentheticalism). For norm views with and without representational
accounts, see Benton and van Elswyk 2020, 250–253.
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2.1 Faulty conjunctions
Initial discussions of a norm of assertion standardly cite the strangeness of
asserting Moorean paradoxical conjunctions,7 particularly the belief and
knowledge versions:
(1) # It is raining but I do not believe it is.
(2) # It is raining but I do not know it is.
Notice that commuting the conjuncts of such assertions (or those discussed
below) does not make them sound any better. The infelicity of such assertions
(which I mark with “#”) isn’t merely one of surprise given that they rarely are
made in normal conversation.8 It is rather that they positively clash: upon
hearing them, it is unclear what to believe from such a speaker: should one
trust the sincere asserter of (1) or (2) that it is raining?
What Moore and others found interesting about such conjunctions is that
they might well be true; and thus any infelicity arising from asserting them
cannot be due to semantic inconsistency, in the way that asserting a contra-
diction would be, or even a conjunction of a claim and something entailed
by it (for example, “This is a square but not a shape”). Further evidence
that semantic inconsistency is not in play comes from our ability to entertain
the truth of each conjunct, the ease of embedding (1) or (2) within the an-
tecedent of a conditional.9 So diagnosing their infelicity seems to depend on
a certain pragmatic eect of making an assertion. Explaining it using the rep-
resentational language from earlier: first, asserting that p represents oneself
as knowing that p. And so by asserting the conjuncts of (2), one represents
oneself as knowing that it is raining, and as knowing that one does not know
7Perhaps more aptly named after MacIver 1938, who discussed them first.
8After all, we are constantly hearing novel sentences or amusing ones which we can
understand or at least entertain: the surprise induced by “Beyoncé is a vegetarian chipmunk”
is not due to incoherence. (Thanks to Jason Stanley for this example.)
9That is, “If it is raining but I do not know it, then I will get soaked when I go out” is an
understandable and a felicitous conditional. So it isn’t that the utterance of such conjunctions
in all linguistic constructions sounds bad, but rather those where the conjunction is asserted
outright.
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this. But one cannot know that it is raining and also know that one does not
know that it is raining (because knowledge is factive). So the infelicity arises
from what one represents about oneself by asserting the first conjunct, and
what one explicitly disavows as being so in the second conjunct. And the
first claim, that asserting represents one as knowing, would be explained by
kna: for if there is a norm of permission on assertion requiring knowledge,
in asserting one thereby represents oneself as satisfying that requirement. Fi-
nally, because knowing plausibly involves believing, a parallel argument can
explain the infelicity of (1) in terms of kna.
Yet more faulty conjunctions are also best explained by kna. For example:
(3) # I hope that John is in his oce, but he is not there.
(4) # I regret that they lost, but I don’t know whether they lost.
(3) contains no knowledge disavowal, whereas (4) contains no conjunct assert-
ing the proposition at issue. Yet with some plausible supplementation, kna
can also explain them. Hoping that p is somehow incompatible with know-
ing whether p.10 But then, given kna, conjoining a self-ascription of hope in
a proposition will conflict with an outright assertion of that proposition or
its negation, because the assertion represents one as knowing it. Similarly,
in (4), asserting with the factive predicate I regret that implies, or has as its
precondition, that one knows the proposition regretted. Thus asserting its
first conjunct represents one as knowing it; but as with (2), this conflicts with
disavowing knowledge of in the second conjunct.
Noteworthy here is that other candidate norms on assertion which invoke
lesser epistemic requirements such as justification, or justified belief, or truth,
do not as easily explain what is wrong with the above conjunctions. For it
seems to most philosophers perfectly plausible that I could, with regard to (1),
say, be justified in believing that it’s raining while also justified in believing
that I don’t know this.11 Or with regard to (3), I might be justified in believing
10See e.g. Benton 2021.
11Though not if knowledge is also the norm of belief; if so, then both believing and
asserting (1) or (2) can be diagnosed as faulty in terms of knowledge.
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that I hope John’s in his oce, but also justified in believing he’s not there. So
any such alternatives to kna will have to appeal to other resources to explain
why such assertions seem to come o so poorly, or why they seem to lack
much communicative value.
2.2 Conversational patterns
More thoroughgoing data best explained by kna comes from conversational
patterns, which directly or indirectly invoke the standard of knowledge. These
are often presented separately from the paradoxical conjunctions considered
above, but as we shall see, some of these data are related, and explainable
only by kna.
Prompts.12 To prompt an assertion, one may ask, “What time is the meet-
ing?” or “Do you know what time the meeting is?” Both seem to be used
interchangeably by speakers, and each is understood by hearers to be prac-
tically equivalent: each is asking for the meeting time. Why would this be?
kna can explain this by noting that knowledge is the standard for permissi-
bly asserting in answer to such questions; so the former question requests an
assertion which, given kna, implicitly expects a knowledgeable answer. It is
practically interchangeable with the latter question, since the latter directly
asks for a knowledgeable answer, by citing that standard.13
Abstentions. When prompted for an assertion, one can decline to reply
by citing one’s lack of knowledge: “I don’t know.” And one can similarly
abstain by saying, “I can’t say,” or “I can’t tell.” Indeed, one could disavow
such knowledge while also indicating that one can’t assert. The deontic
modal “can” here flags whether one has permission so to assert. kna easily
explains all this: for in citing one’s lack of knowledge, one explains why one
cannot respond with an outright assertion; and claiming that one lacks the
permission so to respond implies that it is because one lacks the relevant
epistemic standing to do so, namely, because one does not know the answer.
12For these first three patterns, see especially Turri 2010 and 2016b.
13By contrast, we do not often prompt with questions like “What do you (reasonably)
believe about...?” When we do use dierent prompts, like “Do you have any idea what...?”,
they signal an invitation for something weaker than outright assertion, such as a guess or
hedged assertion. See below for hedges.
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This explanation is reinforced by further faulty conjunctions involving
appeals to such permission. For example,
(5) # Your case isn’t still being reviewed, but I can tell you that it is.
(6) # I don’t know whether your case is still being reviewed, but I can
tell you that it is. (Turri 2011, 39)
kna can oer a comparable explanation of such conjunctions to that given
in section 2.1 above. By asserting a proposition you represent yourself as
knowing it, but for (5) this seems to conflict, given kna, with then claiming
that you can tell them its negation. Similarly, for (6), by denying knowledge
of a certain proposition you represent yourself, given kna, as not being able
to assert it; but this conflicts with the second claim that you can do so.
Challenges.14 One can typically, and appropriately, respond to an asser-
tion with the question, “How do you know?” Yet asking this is normally
regarded perfectly acceptable and relevant to a conversation, even though
the speaker may not have explicitly referenced anyone’s knowledge in their
assertion. And often, such a question can be used as an implicit challenge
to the authority of the assertor. Why would this question then be relevant,
and enjoy a default propriety in most conversations; and why can it be used
to implicitly challenge their authority? Given kna, one’s assertion is only
proper if one knows what one asserted; so it will typically be relevant to ask
how one knows.
Moreover, one can more more aggressively challenge an assertor by asking
“Do you (really) know that?” More aggressive still is, “You don’t know that!"
In both cases, the speaker is put on the spot to defend their epistemic position
with respect to their assertion, and if not well defended, the conversational
participants will likely proceed as if the conversational common ground no
longer accepts the proposition asserted. What explains all this? kna can
explain the increasing aggressiveness of such questions as follows: if “How do
you know?” implicitly challenges a speaker’s authority, “Do you know that?”
explicitly challenges it; whereas “You don’t know that!” explicitly rejects their
14See Austin 1961, 45; Unger 1975, 263–265; Williamson 2000, 252–253.
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authority. Successful substantiation of one’s knowledge is the clear standard
for whether the conversation proceeds as if the asserted claim stands. (This is
not to equate substantiating that one knows with actually knowing or having
that epistemic authority; and for conversational purposes, defending one’s
claim can sometimes be dicult. What is noteworthy is that interlocutors
will make a judgment about one’s knowledge, and if deemed not knowing,
the conversational “score” normally won’t reflect one’s asserted claim.)
It is often overlooked how the data from challenge questions relate to
the faulty conjunctions discussed earlier. Yet the evidence from Moorean-
paradoxical constructions like (2) and the evidence from challenge questions
are related in a way that only kna is well-positioned to explain. For the
“How do you know?” challenge can elicit a de facto Moorean paradox within
a conversational context:
A: It is raining.
B: How do you know?
A: Oh, I don’t.
B: What?
A: Still, it’s raining.
B’s question eectively puts A into a potential Moorean predicament. So it
looks like any explanation of what is problematic about the Moorean con-
junction ought also to explain why the challenge questions are so apt, and
vice versa: and even better, they ought to be given the same explanation.
kna does just that: because assertions represent their speakers as knowing,
A’s assertion invites the supposition that A knows; likewise, because asser-
tions represent their speakers as knowing, any flat-out asserted conjunct of
a Moorean sentence invites the supposition that its asserter knows it. Thus
kna oers a unified explanation of both data.15
Hedges. One strand of data that appears best explained by kna
concerns hedging behavior and our normative interpretations of them.16
15This is significant because kna’s competitors fare poorly at providing a unified account
of the challenge questions and the Moorean conjunctions; indeed, they handle the data in a
fragmented way, citing distinct considerations for each.
16Some of this material is covered more in Benton and van Elswyk 2020.
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Speakers can append attitudinal expressions like I think, I believe, or even
I hope to a declarative in order to convey a weakened epistemic position, thus:
(7) Amia went home early.
(a) Amia went home early, I think.
(b) Amia went home early, I believe.
That is, in asserting (7) one represents oneself as being in a stronger
epistemic position than one who utters (7a) or (7b). Likewise, adverbials
like reportedly or evidently, or modals such as may(be), perhaps, might, or it’s
possible can be used to similar eect.17 For example,
(c) Amia reportedly went home early.
(d) Perhaps Amia went home early.
It seems clear that each of these hedges serve to weaken the commitment
from whatever the norm requires of outright assertion; given kna, hedging
distances the speaker from knowing the complement proposition which is the
claim under discussion.
That knowledge is the norm is supported by two features of such hedging
behavior. First, each of (a)–(d) above permit adding a conjunct disavowing
knowledge of the proposition that Amia went home early. For example, such
additions to (b), (c), and (d) yield the acceptable conjunctions (note well
the aptness of but to conjoin):
(b¬K) Amia went home early, I believe, but I don’t know that she did.
(c¬K) Amia went home early, reportedly, but I don’t know that she did.
(d¬K) Perhaps Amia went home early, but I don’t know.
Yet by comparison, if one were instead to add a conjunct claiming knowledge
(even when conjoining with indeed), the assertion will come o as oddly
17See especially Hawthorne 2004, 23–31 in his defense of kna.
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problematic. For if one claims to know in the second conjunct, it seems
bizarre to have hedged in the first conjunct:
(b&K) ? Amia went home early, I believe; indeed, I know that she did.
(c&K) ? Amia went home early, reportedly; indeed, I know that she did.
(d&K) ? Perhaps Amia went home early; indeed, I know this.
Similar data can be generated using other hedged constructions, of course.
This kind of evidence supports kna in at least two ways. On the one hand,
the hedged claims always seem compatible with disavowing knowledge, where
both the hedged conjunct and the knowledge disavowal serve to explain why
the speaker didn’t simply unqualifiedly assert: each implicitly suggests that
knowledge is what would’ve been needed in order to unqualifiedly assert it.
Yet on the other hand, hedging feels out of place when one also claims knowl-
edge, which is to be expected if one’s having satisfied the norm of assertion
absolves one from the need to hedge.
Parentheticals. A related kind of evidence for kna involves a pattern
found by using attitudinal expressions in parenthetical position as in (a) and
(b). In each case, I think or I believe can take a fronting main clause position,
or parenthetical position, including sentence-final:
(a) Amia went home early, I think.
(b) Amia, I believe, went home early.
But I know, though it can be used felicitously in main clause position (“I
know that Amia went home early”), sounds odd and overly redundant in
parenthetical position:
(k) ? Amia, I know, went home early.
(k) ? Amia went home early, I know.
So the sorts of attitudinal expressions which uniformly allow one to hedge
against the primary proposition (that Amia went home early) are also those
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which acceptably take on parenthetical position; whereas the attitude term
specifying the kna’s content, know, sits redundantly in parenthetical position.
(One might include contrasting information to make it non-redundant, such
as adding to (k) above: “...but I don’t know about the others.” Of course,
kna can explain such exceptions as well.)
Furthermore, know also marks the dierence between acceptable hedged
claims conjoined with self-disavowals of knowledge, and redundantly strange
conjunctions of hedged claims with self-attributions of knowledge. In other
words, these hedging expressions cluster around the notion of knowledge
and are applied rightly when distancing oneself from knowing, but applied
wrongly when conveying or claiming knowledge for the speaker. The best
explanation of these patterns is plausibly that knowledge sets the standard
for proper assertion.18
Mutual reasoning. An overlooked argument from Adler 2009 shows that
kna explains cases where a hearer responds to a speaker’s assertion with
a claim that would lower the probability of the speaker’s assertion, were its
probability less than 1. Yet the hearer’s response is not treated as undermining
the speaker’s claim:
... let the speaker assert that Miss Scarlett did the foul deed or the
weapon was a wrench (F ∨ W), expressive of his corresponding
belief. The hearer responds by asserting that the wrench is too
heavy for Miss Scarlett to have wielded it, ¬(F & W). In accord
with the knowledge norm, neither speaker nor hearer treat ¬(F &
W) as undermining evidence of F ∨ W, but as a complementary
contribution. (Adler 2009, 408)
B’s reply ought to lower the probability of A’s claim, for it removes one way in
which A’s (inclusive) disjunction could be true. But everyone will regard B’s
claim as complementary to A’s rather than undermining of it, inviting the in-
ference that only one of the disjuncts holds: either Miss Scarlett did the deed
another way, or that another criminal used a wrench. Similar results apply in
the simplest case of disjunctive syllogism, such as if B had instead replied that
“Miss Scarlett did not do the foul deed.” kna can explain this speaker–hearer
18For more, see especially Benton 2011, Blauuw 2012, and van Elswyk 2021.
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harmony better than, say, a rational credibility norm: for given kna, A’s dis-
junctive claim conveys that A knows the disjunction but doesn’t know which
disjunct is true; and B’s reply, rather than being understood as a challenge to
A’s disjunction, lowering its probability, is rightly interpreted as a supporting
premise for mutual reasoning. B’s contribution adds knowledge which refines
the disjunction from inclusive to exclusive.
2.3 Permission, excuse, and blame
Some kna theorists have appealed to intuitive judgments about the imper-
missibility of lottery assertions: to many, it seems improper to assert outright
that you will lose a lottery for which you hold a ticket (before having heard
the winner announced), even though your odds of winning make it exceed-
ingly probable that you will lose.19 Many also find it plausible that one does
not know that such a ticket will lose. kna proponents explain the first point
in terms of the second: the reason it is inappropriate for one to make such
lottery assertions, absent special knowledge about the lottery being rigged,
is that one does not know that the ticket will lose. But some people do not
have such strong judgments about the impermissibility of lottery assertions,
even those who otherwise defend kna (e.g., Turri 2011, 37 n. 1). So such data
seems less probative.
Yet there remains a set of judgments arising from taking the first-person
perspective of deciding what and when to assert. When believing outright a
proposition, many will feel this to be phenomenologically just like treating
oneself as knowing; and thus the decision about whether to assert outright
will be guided by consideration of whether one knows. This seems apt be-
cause any norm, kna or otherwise, insofar as one aims to conform to it, will
generate secondary norms of guidance. If kna is correct, then the secondary
norm derived from it will require that one refrain from asserting outright
when one judges oneself as not knowing. (Note that this in turn provides an
elegant explanation of the hedging patterns discussed above, and how these
convey the responsibility of careful speakers.)
19Williamson 2000, 246–252; Hawthorne 2004, 21–23, among others. Note that some
philosophers mistakenly think of lottery judgments as comprising all or a significant portion
of the evidence for kna (e.g. Lackey 2007, 611–613; Papineau 2021, 5329).
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This structural feature of norms is fully general. For any norm of prohi-
bition that requires one to do something only in conditions C, its secondary
guidance norm will enjoin one to refrain from so doing whenever one regards
oneself as not in C.20 (Likewise for a dierent sort of norm that obliges one to
do something in C, its secondary norm will enjoin one to do it whenever one
regards oneself as in C.) Recognizing this distinction between layers of pro-
priety enables the kna theorist to explain our judgments about cases where
one reasonably asserts without knowledge, where it seems one nevertheless
has, in some sense, acted appropriately: “One may reasonably do something
impermissible because one reasonably but falsely believes it to be permissi-
ble. In particular, one may reasonably assert p, even though one does not
know p, because it is very probable on one’s evidence that one knows p”
(Williamson 2000, 256). Thus violations of kna will be impermissible, but
might nevertheless be reasonable, and thus need not be blameworthy. For
assessments of blame typically track reasonableness, not permissibility.21 In-
deed, when one does something wrong or impermissible, but they reasonably
thought they were acting permissibly, we will be inclined to excuse them for
the impermissible act, which also mitigates how blameworthy they are. For
many such cases then, our willingness to blame or excuse can be explained
in terms of secondary propriety or whether one acted reasonably given one’s
grasp of the norm.
2.4 Knowing and showing
Finally, there is a striking parallel between the above data with respect to
assertion, and related patterns with respect to pedagogical instances of
showing how to do something (Buckwalter and Turri 2014; Turri 2016b,
21–25). In brief, just as knowledge is the norm of assertion (kna), knowing
how is also the norm of showing how. This is supported by comparable
faulty conjunctions, and hedges:
20Williamson 2000, 245 and 256 draws the distinction between “permissible” and “rea-
sonable” assertion; DeRose 2009, 94–95 calls them “primary” versus “secondary” propriety.
21For more, see Kelp and Simion 2017 and Williamson forthcoming. For the dimensions
of reasonableness, negligence, and viciousness (knowingly acting impermissibly), see Benton
2019, 127–128.
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(8) # I don’t know how to do it, but here is how it is done.
(9) # I can show you how to do it, but I don’t know how.
These conjunctions sound quite flawed, in the way Moorean paradoxical
conjunctions do. But inserting an appropriate hedge renders them acceptable:
(10) I don’t know how to do it, but I think it’s done something like this.22
There is also parallel evidence from apt prompts, abstensions, challenges,
and responses. By attempting to (or oering to) show one how to, say, ride a
bicycle, one thereby represents oneself as knowing how to do so. The prompts
“How do you do this?” and “Do you know how to do this?” as well as “Can
you show me how to do this?” are all interpretable as either indirect or direct
requests to be shown how. Not knowing how is sucient excuse to abstain
from fulfilling such requests. And one only properly responds armatively
to such prompts if one indeed knows how and further, can show them how.
There is a similar range of aggressiveness to the challenges, “How do you
know how to do that?”, “Do you (really) know how?”, and “You don’t know
how to do that!” And so on.23
Thus the above sections show the wide range of linguistic data and cor-
responding judgments which seem to be best explained by kna. And such
data are not concocted merely from armchair philosophizing: most of them
are confirmed by experimental testing using thousands of subjects.24 Not
only does kna provide elegant explanations of each such strand of data,
from faulty conjunctions, conversational patterns, evaluative judgments, and
more; it also oers a unified explanation of such data in terms of the knowl-
edge norm, rather than needing to appeal to external resources to explain
any portion of them.25
22Buckwalter and Turri 2014, 18.
23Note that this datum is neutral with respect to whether knowledge-how is reducible to
a sort of knowledge-that: see Buckwalter and Turri 2014, 19.
24For experimental work from cognitive and social science testing this data, see Turri
2015, 2016b, 2016d, and 2017b.
25Green 2017 and Haziza forthcoming argue that there is also a knowledge norm of im-
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3 Some Objections and Complaints
Many philosophers have argued that their intuitive judgments about cases of
asserting without knowing provide strong evidence against kna. They judge
that a speaker who asserts with only a justified belief that p speaks appropri-
ately and permissibly, even if they assert p falsely or fail to know p (Douven
2006, 476–477; and Lackey 2007, 603, among others26). In particular, they
regard a speaker who justifiedly believes that p, but unluckily given their ev-
idence, p is false, who nevertheless asserts p, speaks blamelessly, for such a
speaker is not properly criticizable for their assertion. But if blameless and
not properly criticizable, such critics reason, a speaker cannot have violated
the norm of assertion. So the norm of assertion cannot even require truth, let
alone knowledge (which is factive, entailing truth). These judgments strike
such philosophers as important objections to kna, which drive them to de-
fend a weaker norm, such as a justification or credibility norm, even though
in so doing they are less able to explain all the data highlighted in section 2.
One serious problem with this approach however, is that it tends to appeal
primarily to such intuitive judgments. But many people are mistakenly led by
their intuitive judgments about breaking a rule to conclude that no rule was
in fact broken at all. This phenomenon is known as excuse validation (Turri
and Blouw 2015; Turri 2019). When people are given a case of someone’s
unintentional rule-breaking, and are asked whether they are blameworthy or
criticizable for acting in violation of the rule, they almost unanimously dis-
agree, insisting that they are blameless in such cases and so not criticizable.
But when also asked if those people broke a rule, roughly half of participants
deny that a rule has actually been broken, contrary to the set-up of the case.27
Similar answers are given for cases where someone unknowingly but reason-
plicature; Kelp 2020 argues there is a knowledge norm of blaming. I do not have space here
to consider the merits of these ideas.
26Schechter 2018 argues against the knowledge norm largely by appealing to normative
judgments about cases where one intuitively may assert without knowledge, and he gestures
hopefully at a broadly Gricean account of communicative norms which abandons the idea of
a norm specific to assertion; unfortunately, that approach has been considerably complicated
by arguments about Gricean quality (Benton 2016b).
27This result persists whether the consequences of breaking the rule are trivial or momen-
tous: Turri 2016b, 46–47.
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ably makes a false assertion. And yet, when the questions are adjusted to ask
whether the person unintentionally broke the rule (or unintentionally made
a false statement), the participants uniformly agree that yes, they uninten-
tionally broke the rule (made a false statement). The explanation of these
results appears to be that roughly half of participants are hesitant to claim
that someone in such a case broke a rule, and so when asked if they did so,
they answer “no” to avoid indirectly blaming a blameless agent; but when
asked whether they unintentionally broke the rule, the explicit reference to
“unintentionally” doing so frees the participant to answer correctly, because
there is no risk now of indirectly blaming them. Thus presence of an excuse
leads many people to mistakenly validate the agent as having broken no rule
at all. As such, critics of the kna who appeal primarily to comparable in-
tuitive judgments about excuse and blame as a guide to what the norm of
assertion must be are likely engaged in excuse validation.28
Relatedly, some philosophers have objected that, intuitively, asserting in
Gettier cases is perfectly permissible, and that this judgment is probative
despite kna theorists’ preferred explanation of such judgments as tracking
reasonability (secondary propriety) rather than permissibility given the norm
(e.g. Lackey 2007, 596–597). And of course, philosophers tend to judge most
Gettier cases (or similarly structured cases) to be ones where the subject lacks
knowledge. The objectors claim that these are strong counterexamples to
kna. But again, such objections do little to explain the wide range of data
which kna best explains. Moreover, experimental testing of these judgments
reveal that most non-philosophers, even in Gettier cases, strongly link their
judgments of knowledge with assertability, and of non-assertability with not
knowing (Turri 2015; 2016b, 43–44; 2016a). This suggests, on the one hand,
that ordinary speakers may regard Gettier cases as being cases of knowledge,
but on the other hand, that they already implicitly accept kna.
Finally, some philosophers complain that there is no distinctively epis-
temic norm of assertion, or no such stable norm which enables us to under-
stand something about assertion. Sometimes this is because they suppose
that assertion will be governed by a variety of other normative dimensions
such as prudence, etiquette, morality, etc., and they speculate that these will
28Cf. Kelp and Simion 2017 for a sophisticated reply to these sorts of worries.
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suce for explaining any seemingly epistemic norms on asserting (e.g. Pagin
2016, 205). Others insist that there is no well-defined category of assertion,
or that it is theoretically uninteresting, or both, urging that we instead focus
our theorizing on the broader notion of “sayings” (Cappelen 2011, and 2020).
These complaints do not, in my view, even amount to objections to the
kna, or to other epistemic norm views. For, first, it is no objection to a view
oering the best explanation of some data merely to speculate that they might
be somehow explained in other ways; one would have to articulate those
explanations and argue for their superiority. And second, it is likewise no
objection to kna to insist that assertion is, to some, an uninteresting linguistic
category, or one which we do not “need in order to pick out any significant
component of our linguistic practice” (Cappelen 2011, 20). For those who do
not find assertion a theoretically useful category, they are free to use dierent
notions if they want to play the game of explaining the data; but if they do
not even want to play that game, it is entirely unclear why they would oer
their views on who is winning that game.29
4 Conclusion
We’ve surveyed the arguments for the idea that knowledge is the central
epistemic norm governing assertion, while nevertheless remaining neutral
on the modal or other status of that norm as it figures in a broader account
of the nature of assertion. kna oers the best explanation of data from
29Cappelen’s latest version of this (2020) seems to conflate locutionary acts (“sayings”)
and illocutionary acts (see his “S”, p. 140), going so far as to deem the latter unworthy of
disciplined theorizing. At times he suggests that his broader category of sayings is not in the
business of explaining any of the relevant linguistic data, because it simply posits an act type
whose tokens are subject to variable norms of prudence, etiquette, practicality, etc. (though
this has been duly studied, e.g. by Turri 2017a); and he worries that “pro-assertion” views
like kna get rather complicated in their explanations of proposed counterexamples (such as
some mentioned above). Yet other times, he insists that his sayings view is simpler and “can
explain all the data that the pro-assertion views [like kna] try to account for... [because they]
focus on a subset of saying” (Cappelen 2020, 145). But he never aims to provide a systemic
account of the norms which might explain any data supporting kna; nor does he grasp that,
if his sayings approach could explain the data covered here, it would need to invoke norms
or themes specific to the illocutionary act of assertion, in which case he’d be entering into
the game of explaining why the data are as they are.
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several faulty conjunctions; from conversational patterns involving prompts,
abstentions, challenges, hedges, parentheticals, and mutual reasoning;
from hypological judgments about permission, excuse, and blame; and it
also extends its insights to explanations of data from knowing how and
showing how. kna not only elegantly explains each strand; it oers a
unified explanation appealing to the same knowledge-theoretic resources
throughout. We’ve also briefly examined a few objections and complaints,
finding them wanting. The case is overwhelming: knowledge is the norm of
assertion.30
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